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Abstract—In this paper, we introduce an efficient and trust-
worthy conditional privacy-preserving communication protocol
for VANETs based on proxy re-signature. The proposed protocol
is characterized by the Trusted Authority (TA) designating the
Roadside Units (RSUs) to translate signatures computed by the
On-Board Units (OBUs) into one that are valid with respect
to TA’s public key. In addition, the proposed protocol offers
both a priori and a posteriori countermeasures: it can not only
provide fast anonymous authentication and privacy tracking, but
guarantees message trustworthiness for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)
communications. Furthermore, it reduces the communication
overhead and offers fast message authentication and, low storage
requirements. We use extensive analysis to demonstrate the
merits of the proposed protocol and to contrast it with previously
proposed solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are very likely to
become the most pervasive and applicable of mobile ad hoc
networks (MANETs) in this decade. Different from the tradi-
tional MANETs, VANET contains not only mobile vehicles,
but also stationary roadside infrastructures. Equipped with
communication devices, vehicles can communicate with each
other or with the roadside units (RSUs) located at critical
points of the road, such as intersections or construction sites.
Different from vehicles, RSUs usually have no buffer con-
straint and can store a lot of information. According to the
Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) [1], each
vehicle equipped with OBU will broadcast routine traffic
messages, such as the position, current time, direction, speed,
acceleration/deceleration, and traffic events, etc. In this way,
drivers can get better awareness of the driving environment
and take early actions to the abnormal situation to improve
the safety of both vehicle drivers and passengers [2]. However,
before the above attractive applications come into reality, the
security and privacy issues should be addressed. Otherwise,
a VANET could be subject to many security threats, which
will lead to increasing malicious attacks and service abuses.
More precisely, an adversary can either forge bogus messages
to mislead other drivers or track the locations of the intended
vehicles. Therefore, how to secure vehicle-to-vehicle commu-
nication in VANETs has been well-studied in recent years [3]–
[21].
Dealing with fraudulent messages in VANETs is a thorny
issue due to its inherent self-organization. The situation is
further deteriorated by the privacy requirements, i.e., the
malicious vehicles are anonymous and cannot be identified in
case of dispute. Countermeasures against fraudulent messages
fall into two classes: a posteriori and a priori.
With a posteriori countermeasure, a trusted authority can
disclose the real identity of targeted OBU in case of a traffic
event dispute, even though the OBU itself is not traceable
by the public. In this way, punishment will be taken against
vehicles who have been proven to have originated fraudu-
lent messages (e.g., the violators will be excluded from the
network). The existing posteriori solutions for VANETs can
mainly be categorized into following classes. The first one is
based on a large number of anonymous keys (denoted as LAB
in the rest of this paper) [3], [4], the second one is based on
a pure group-oriented signature, such as group signature and
ring signature (denoted as GSB in the following) [5], [6], [8],
while the last one employs the roadside units (RSUs) to assist
the vehicle in authenticating messages (denoted as RSUB in
the following) [10]–[12]. Though all of these solutions can
meet the conditional privacy requirement, they are in vain
against irrational attackers such as terrorists. Even for rational
attackers, damage has already occurred when punitive action
is taken.
A priori countermeasure attempts to prevent the generation
of fraudulent messages. In this approach, a message is not
considered valid unless it has been endorsed by a number of
vehicles above a certain threshold. This approach is based on
the assumption that most users are honest, and therefore, they
will not endorse any message containing false data. To achieve
this, messages received must be distinguishable. The use of an
honest majority to prevent generation of fraudulent messages
has previously been proposed in [15]–[17]. However, although
the underlying assumption that there is a majority of honest
vehicles in VANETs generally holds, it cannot be excluded
that a number of malicious vehicles greater than or equal to
the threshold are present in specific locations. Furthermore, for
convenience in implementation, most of schemes assume that
the threshold, i.e., the number of honest vehicles in all cases,
should be treated as a one-size-fits-all concept. However, we
argue that threshold is a scenario-specific concept in the sense
that different scenario may have varying threshold require-
ments. Indeed, the threshold should be adaptive according to
the traffic density and the message scope: A low density of
vehicles calls for a lower threshold, whereas a high density
and a message relevant to all of the traffic in a city require a
sufficiently high threshold.
To address these issues, this paper proposes an efficient and
trustworthy conditional privacy preserving authentication pro-
tocol for vehicle-to-vehicle communication based on proxy re-
signature [22]. Compared to previous message-authentication
schemes [3]–[21], our scheme (which we dub PRSB) has the
following unparalleled features that, we believe, make it an
excellent candidate for the future VANETs:
• Achieving both priori and posteriori countermeasures:
Using the proxy re-signature to secure the vehicle-to-
vehicle communication, the RSUs can be allowed to
transform an OBU’s signature into a TA’s signature on
the same message. This conceals the unique identity of
the OBU to prevent information leakage to the malicious
adversary, while still allowing for internal auditing by the
RSUs. Furthermore, the RSUs can distinguish by itself
whether the message was signed by the same cheating
vehicle multiple times or by multiple honest vehicles. By
this way, our scheme enables the RSUs only transform
the messages endorsed by a number of vehicles greater
than or equal to a threshold, and the vehicles endorsing
cheating messages can later be traced. We also note that
a recent proposal in [17] also achieves both priori and
posteriori countermeasures by drawing on the linkable
group signature.
• Efficiency: Different from GSB protocols [5], [6], [17],
the proposed protocol can efficiently deal with a growing
revocation list and does not rely on updating the group
public key and private key at all unrevoked vehicles.
Furthermore, our protocol does not rely on a large
storage space at each vehicle. Clearly, since the OBU
only need to generate the general signature instead of
the anonymous signature, the OBU communication and
computation overhead will be reduced at a fairly large
scale.
• Threshold-adaptivity: The threshold in our proposal can
be adaptive according to the traffic context, unlike most
previous schemes in which the threshold has to be preset
during the stage of system initialization. This feature
enables our proposal to be deployed in complicated traffic
scenarios.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II presents background information related to vehicular
network design and operation and surveys additional related
work. Section III presents the problem formulation, system
architecture, and design objectives as well as the key crypto-
graphic techniques our solution is based on: bilinear maps and
proxy re-signatures. Section IV details the proposed security
protocol, followed by the security analysis and the perfor-
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Fig. 1. Network Model
mance analysis in Section V and Section VI, respectively.
Section VII concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. System Model
Similar to previous work [10]–[13], the considered system
includes three types of entities: the top Trusted authority (TA),
the immobile RSUs at the roadside, and the moving vehicles
equipped with on-board units (OBUs).
• OBU: A vehicle needs to be registered to the TA with
its public system parameters and corresponding private
key before it joins the VANET. The secret information
such as private keys to be used generates the need for a
tamper-proof device in each vehicle. Similar to previous
work we assume that access to this tamper-proof device
is restricted to authorized parties. OBUs are mobile and
moving most of the time. When the OBUs are on the road,
they regularly broadcast routine safety messages, such as
position, current time, direction, speed, traffic conditions,
traffic events. The information system on each vehicle
aggregates and processes these messages to enable drivers
form a better awareness of their environment (Fig. 1).
The population of OBUs in the system could be up to
billions (as, today, there are about a quarter of billion
light vehicles in the US only).
• RSU: The RSUs are subordinated by the TA, which hold
storage units for storing information coming from the TA
and the OBUs. The main tasks of RSUs are (1) translating
a OBU’s signature under the TA’s public key on the same
message, and (2) assisting the TA to efficiently track the
real OBU identity of any safety message. Without the
authorization of the TA, the RSUs will not disclose any
inner information. We remark that each RSU is physically
secure and cannot be compromised. Meanwhile, RSUs
cannot generate signatures on behalf of either the OBU
or the TA. Different from the vehicles, we assume that
RSUs have neither computation and energy constraints
nor buffer size constraints. Due to the fact that there is no
computation and storage constraints at RSUs, RSUs can
be able to serve as the proxy to translate the signatures
from OBUs.
• TA: The TA is in charge of the registration of all RSUs
and OBUs each vehicle is equipped with. The TA can
reveal the real identity of a safety message sender by
incorporating with its subordinate RSUs. To the end, the
TA requires ample computation and storage capability,
and the TA cannot be compromised and is fully trusted
by all parties in the system.
The network dynamics are characterized by quasi-
permanent mobility, high speed, and (in most cases) short
connection times between neighboring vehicles or between a
vehicle and a roadside infrastructure network access point. The
assumed communication protocol between neighboring OBUs
or between an OBU and a RSU is 5.9 GHz Dedicated Short
Range Communication (DSRC) [1] IEEE 802.11p.
B. Related Work
To achieve both message authentication and conditional
anonymity, Raya et al. [3], [4] introduced the LAB protocol.
Their key idea is to install on each OBU a large number of
private keys and their corresponding anonymous certificates.
To sign each launched message, a vehicle randomly selects
one of its anonymous certificates and uses its corresponding
private key. The other vehicles use the public key of the
sender enclosed with the anonymous certificate to authenticate
the source of the message. These anonymous certificates are
generated by employing the pseudo-identities of the vehicles,
instead of taking any real identity information of the drivers.
Each certificate has a short life time to meet the drivers’privacy
requirement. Although LAB protocol can effectively meet the
conditional privacy requirement, it is inefficient and may meet
a scalability bottleneck. The reason is that a sufficient numbers
of certificates must be issued to each vehicle to maintain
anonymity over a significant period of time. As a result, the
certificate database to be searched by the TA in order to match
a compromised certificate to its owner’s identity is huge. In
addition, the protocols of [4] are extended for providing confi-
dentiality in specific scenarios of VANET implementations in
[19]. Subsequently, Lin et al. [9] developed the ‘time-efficient
and secure vehicular communication’ scheme (TSVC) based
on the TESLA (Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authen-
tication)standard (RFC 4082) [23]. With TSVC, a vehicle first
broadcasts a commitment of hash chain to its neighbors and
then uses the elements of the hash chain to generate a message
authentication code (MAC) with which other neighbors can
authenticate this vehicles’ following messages. Because of the
fast speed of MAC verification, the computation overhead of
TSVC is reduced significantly. However, TSVC also requires
a huge set of anonymous public/private key pairs as well as
their corresponding public key certificates to be preloaded in
each vehicle. Furthermore, TSVC may not be robust when
the traffic becomes extremely dynamic as a vehicle should
broadcast its key chain commitment much more frequently.
Lin et al. [6], [7] proposed the GSB protocol, based on the
group signature [24]. With GSB, each vehicle stores only a
private key and a group public key. Messages are signed using
the group signature scheme without revealing any identity
information to the public. Thus privacy is preserved while the
trusted authority is able to track the identity of the sender.
However, the time for safety message verification grows
linearly with the number of revoked vehicles in the revocation
list in the entire network. Hence, each vehicle has to spend
additional time on safety message verification. Furthermore,
when the number of revoked vehicles in the revocation list is
larger than some threshold, the protocol requires every remain-
ing vehicle to calculate a new private key and group public key
based on the exhaustive list of revoked vehicles whenever a
vehicle is revoked. Lin et al. [6], [7]do not explore solutions to
effectively updated the system parameters for the participating
to vehicles in a timely, reliable and scalable fashion. This issue
is not explored and represents an important obstacle to the
success of this scheme. To address the scalability concern,
Xiong et al. [8] proposed a spontaneous protocol based on
the revocable ring signature [25], which allows the vehicle to
generate the message without requiring online assistance from
the RSUs or the other vehicles. In this solution, the remaining
vehicles are not required to update their system parameters
regardless of the number of revoked vehicles. However, this
protocol suffers larger communication overhead than that of
other protocols because the length of ring signature depends
on the size of the ring.
Recently, Zhang et al. [10], [11] proposed a novel RSU-
aided message authentication scheme (RSUB), which makes
the RSUs responsible for verifying the authenticity of mes-
sages sent from vehicles and for notifying the results back
to vehicles. Compared to the solutions previously mentioned,
this scheme enables lower computation and communication
overheads for each vehicle. Independently, Lu et al. [12]
introduced an efficient conditional privacy preservation pro-
tocol for VANETs based on generating on-the-fly short-lived
anonymous keys for the communication between vehicles and
RSUs. These keys enable fast anonymous authentication and
conditional privacy. Furthermore, Wasef et al. [18] proposed
a RSUs-aided Distributed Certificate Service (DCS) scheme
along with a hierarchical authority architecture. In this way,
vehicles can update theirs pseudonymous certificate sets from
the RSUs. However, all of the above solutions fall into
the posteriori countermeasures, which can only exclude the
rational attackers by punishing the malicious users after the
attack.
To reduce the damage to a bare minimum, the priori
countermeasures have been proposed to prevent the gener-
ation of fake messages. In this approach, a message is not
considered valid unless it has been endorsed by a number of
vehicles above a certain threshold. Most recently, Kounga et
al. [16] proposed a solution that permits vehicles to verify the
reliability of information received from anonymous origins.
In this solution, each vehicle can generate the public/private
key pairs by itself. However, the assumption in this solution
is very restricted in that additional hardware is needed on
the OBU. After that, a proposal is also presented following
the priori protection paradigm based on threshold signature
by Daza et al. [15]. Nevertheless, to obtain the anonymity,
this protocol assumes that the OBU installed on the vehicle
can be removable and multi OBUs could alternatively be
used with the same vehicle (like several cards can be used
within a cell phone in the same time). Thus, this assumption
may enable malicious adversary to mount the so-called Sybil
attack: vehicles using different anonymous key pairs from
corresponding OBUs can sign multiple messages to pretend
that these messages were sent by different vehicles. Since
multi OBUs can be installed on the same vehicle, no one can
find out whether all of these signatures come from the same
vehicle or not. After that, Wu et al. [17] proposed a novel
protocol based on linkable group signature, which is equipped
with both priori and posteriori countermeasures. However,
they face the same adverse conditions in GSB protocol in
which the verification time grows linearly with the number of
revoked vehicles and every remaining vehicle need to update
its private key and group public key when the number of
revoked vehicles is larger than some threshold.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Objectives
To avoid reinventing the wheel, we refer the readers to other
works [3], [6], [17] for a full discussion of the attacker model.
In the context of this work, we focus on the following security
objectives.
1) Efficient anonymous authentication of safety messages:
The proposed scheme should provide an efficient and
anonymous message authentication mechanism. First, all
accepted messages should be delivered unaltered, and
the origin of the messages should be authenticated to
guard against impersonation attacks. Meanwhile, from
the perspective of vehicle owners, it may not be accept-
able to leak personal information, including identity and
location, while authenticating messages. Therefore, pro-
viding a secure yet anonymous message authentication is
critical to the applicability of VANETs. Furthermore, the
proposed scheme should have low overheads for safety
message verification and storage at OBUs.
2) Efficient tracking of the source of a disputed safety
message: An important and challenging issue in these
conditions is enabling the TA to retrieve a vehicle’s real
identity from its pseudo identity. If this feature is not
provided, anonymous authentication can only prevent
an outside attack, but cannot deal with an inside one.
Furthermore, the system should not only provide safety
message traceability to prevent inside attacks, but also
have reasonable overheads for the revealing the identity
of a message sender.
3) Threshold authentication: A message is viewed as trust-
worthy only after it has been endorsed by at least n vehi-
cles, where n is a threshold. The threshold mechanism is
a priori countermeasure that improves the confidence of
other vehicles in a message. In addition, the threshold
in the proposed scheme should be adaptive, that is to
say, the sender can dynamically change the threshold
according to the traffic context and scenarios.
B. Bilinear Maps
Since bilinear maps [26] are the basis of our proposed
scheme, we briefly introduce them here.
Multiplicative cyclic groups (G,GT ) of prime order q are
called bilinear map groups if there is an efficiently computable
mapping eˆ : G×G→ GT with the following properties:
1) Bilinearity: For all g, h ∈ G, and a, b ∈ Z, eˆ(ga, hb) =
eˆ(g, h)ab.
2) Non-degeneracy: eˆ(g, h) 6= 1GT whenever g, h 6= 1G.
Such an admissible bilinear map eˆ can be constructed by
the modified Weil or Tate pairing on elliptic curves. For
example, the Tate pairing on MNT curves [27] gives the
efficient implementation, and the representations of G can be
expressed in 161 bits when the order q is a 160-bit prime.
By this construction, the discrete logarithm problem in G can
reach 80-bit security level.
C. Proxy Re-Signature
Proxy re-signature schemes, introduced by Blaze, Bleumer,
and Strauss [28], and formalized later by Ateniese and Ho-
henberger [29], allow a semi-trusted proxy to transform a
delegatees signature into a delegators signature on the same
message by using some additional information. Proxy re-
signature can be used to implement anonymizable signatures
in which outgoing messages are first signed by specific users.
Before releasing them to the outside world, a proxy translates
signatures into ones that verify under a system’s public key
so as to conceal the original issuer’s identity and the internal
structure of the organization. Recently, Libert et al. [22] have
introduced the first multi-hop unidirectional proxy re-signature
scheme wherein the proxy can only translate signatures in one
direction and messages can be resigned a polynomial number
of times. We use this scheme as the basis for our efficient and
trustworthy conditional privacy-preservation protocol.
IV. EFFICIENT AND TRUSTWORTHY VEHICULAR
COMMUNICATIONS SCHEME
This section describes in detail our efficient and trustworthy
privacy-preserving protocol for VANET. TA, the delegator,
will designate the RSUs translating signatures computed from
OBUs, the delegatee, into one that is valid w.r.t. TA’s public
key by storing the re-signature key at the RSUs. Upon re-
ceiving OBU’s signatures, the RSUs can validate them and
re-sign the message using the re-signature key. This message
can be anonymously authenticated by any vehicle participating
in the system by verifying this signature (the only information
needed for verification is the TA’s public keys). By this way,
proxy re-signatures can be used to conceal identities of the
OBU. Furthermore, RSUs could log which OBU signed the
message for solving the dispute, but keep that information
confidential to the public.
The notation used throughout this paper is listed in Table
I. The proposed security protocol is an extension of proxy
re-signature scheme [22] in order to support conditional
anonymity authentication with trustworthy. Specifically, the
proposed security protocol contains four phases, which are
described in the following paragraphs.
TABLE I
NOTATIONS
Notations Descriptions
TA: Trusted Authority
Vi: The ith vehicle
RSUj : an RSU works at location Lj
G, GT : two cyclic groups of same order q
g: The generator of G
RIDi : The real identity of the vehicle Vi
IDi : The pseudo-identity of the vehicle Vi
M : A message sent by the vehicle Vi
xi : The private key of the vehicle Vi
Xi = g
xi : The corresponding public key of the vehicle Vi
xRSUj : The private key of the RSU RSUj
XRSUj = g
xRSUj : The corresponding public key of the RSU RSUj
xTA: The private key of the TA
XTA = g
xTA : The corresponding public key of the TA
H1(·) : A hash function such as H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q
H2(·) : A hash function such as H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G
Encκ() : A secure symmetric encryption algorithm with
secret key κ
a ‖ b String concatenation of a and b
A. System Initialization
Firstly, as described in section II-A, we assume each vehicle
is equipped with a tamper-proof device, which is secure
against any compromise attempts in any circumstance. With
the tamper-proof device on vehicles, an adversary cannot ex-
tract any data stored in the device including key material, data,
and codes [3]. We assume that there is a Trusted Authority
(TA) which is in charge of registering the RSUs and the OBUs
installed on the vehicles. Prior to the network deployment, the
TA sets up the system parameters for each OBU and RSU as
follows:
• Let G, GT be two cyclic groups of same order q. Let
eˆ : G×G→ GT be a bilinear map.
• The TA first randomly chooses xTA ∈R Z∗q as its private
key, and computes XTA = gxTA as its public key. The
TA also chooses two secure cryptographic hash functions
H1 : {0, 1}
∗ → Z∗q and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G, and a secure
symmetric encryption algorithm Encκ() with secret key
κ.
• The TA generates public/private key pair for each subor-
dinated RSUj works at location Lj as follows:
– The TA randomly selects an integer xRSUj ∈R Z∗q
and computes XRSUj = g
xRSUj
.
– The TA sends the public/private key pair to RSUj
through a secure channel.
• Each vehicle Vi with real identity RIDi generates its
public/private key pair as follows:
TABLE II
MESSAGE FORMAT FOR OBU
Message ID Payload Timestamp RSUj’s Public Key Signature
2 100 bytes 4 bytes 20 bytes 20 bytes
– The vehicle Vi first chooses xi ∈R Z∗q as its private
key, and computes Xi = gxi as its public key.
– Vi randomly selects an integer ti ∈R Z∗q to determine
the verification information of Xi: ai = H1(gti ‖
RIDi) and bi = (ti + xi · ai). Then Vi sends
{Xi, RIDi, ai, bi} to TA.
– After receiving {Xi, RIDi, ai, bi}, TA checks
whether the following equation holds:
ai
?
= H1((g
biX−aii ) ‖ RIDi)
If it holds, then {Xi, RIDi} is identified as the
valid public key and identity. Otherwise, it will be
rejected. After that, the TA stores the (Xi, RIDi) in
its records.
– In the end, TA generates the re-signature key Ri =
X
1/xTA
i = g
xi/xTA which allows turning signatures
from vehicle Vi into signatures from TA, and sends
the item (Ri, Xi) to all RSUs through a secure
channel.
• Each vehicle is preloaded with the public parameters
{G,GT , q,XTA,H, Encκ()}. In addition, the tamper-
proof device of each vehicle is preloaded with its pri-
vate/public key pairs (xi, Xi) and corresponding anony-
mous certificates (these certificates are generated by tak-
ing the vehicle’s pseudo-identity IDi).
B. OBU Safety Message Generation
The format of the safety messages sent by the OBU is
defined in Table II, which consists of five fields: message
ID, payload, timestamp, RSUj’s public key and signature.
The message ID defines the message type, and the payload
field may include the information on the vehicle’s position,
direction, speed, traffic events, event time, and so on. Accord-
ing to [31], the payload of a safety message is 100 bytes. A
timestamp is used to prevent the message replay attack. The
next field is RSUj , the public key of RSU which will translate
signature computed from OBU. The first four fields are signed
by the vehicle, by which the “signature” field can be derived.
Table II specifies the suggested length for each field.
To endorse a message M , vehicle Vi generates a signature
on the message, and then encrypts and sends it to RSUj . After
receiving n or more valid signatures from the vehicles, RSUj
re-sign the message with the corresponding re-signature key
and broadcast the trustworthy signature. Fig. 2 shows the OBU
safety message generation, and the detailed protocol steps are
described as follows.
1) RSUj broadcasts its public key XRSUj periodically,
e.g., every 5 sec;
2) Vi computes signature σ(1) = H2(M)xi ∈ G on mes-
sage M , where xi is Vi’s secret key and M is formatted
jLRSU ( )jID at location
1)
OBU ( , )i iID RID
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Fig. 2. OBU Safety Message Generation
as [IDType ‖ Payload ‖ T imestamp ‖ XRSUj ]. Then,
Vi randomly chooses r ∈R Z∗q and computes the shared
secret key φ = XrRSUj and the hint ψ = g
r
. After that,
Vi sends the (ψ,Encφ(M,σ(1), Xi)) to RSUj;
3) RSUj computes the shared secret key φ′ = ψxRSUj =
gr·xRSUj to decrypt the received message, and then looks
up the newly updated revocation list from TA to check
the validity of the public key Xi. After that, RSUj
checks whether the signature σ(1) is valid as follows:
eˆ(σ(1), g)
?
= eˆ(Xi,H2(M)). Then RSUj checks the
validity of the RSU’s public key and the freshness of
timestamp embedded in the message.
4) After receiving n or more valid signatures from the
vehicles on the same message M , RSUj search (Ri, Xi)
according to (M,σ(1), Xi) from its database. Then
RSUj chooses randomly s ∈R Z∗q and computes
σ(2) = (σ0, σ1, σ2) = (σ
(1)s , Xsi , R
s
i )
= (H2(M)
xis, Xsi , g
sxi/xTA)
where Ri have been preloaded along with Xi in the
RSUj during the initialization phase. Then RSUj stores
the trace evidence table with item (M,Xi) in its local
database. In the end, TA broadcast the trustworthy
signature (M,σ(2)) to all vehicles among its coverage
range.
Note that the threshold n can adaptively be changed
according to the type of message and various scenar-
ios. For instance, if the message is an alert about an
emergency braking by the vehicle ahead, the threshold
can be set as low as 1. However, if the message is
an announcement that will affect many vehicles, the
threshold can be set to be appropriately high to improve
the trustworthiness by also taking into account the vehi-
cle density among the RSU’s communication range. By
this way, the signature σ(1) is turned into a trustworthy
signature σ(2) under TA’s public key.
C. Message Verification
Once a trustworthy message σ(2) is received, the receiving
vehicle performs signature verification by checking whether
the following conditions are true:
eˆ(σ0, g) = eˆ(H2(M), σ1) eˆ(σ1, g) = eˆ(σ2, XTA)
This verification provides vehicles with the assurance that
such a signature can only have been computed if at least n
vehicles have endorsed M .
D. OBU fast tracing
If a vehicle produced a signature on the message M and this
message was found to be fraudulent, a membership tracing
operation is started to determine the real identity of the
signature originator. In detail, the TA first position the RSU
by extracting the RSU’s public key XRSUj from the message
[IDType ‖ Payload ‖ T imestamp ‖ XRSUj ]. According to
the TA’s demand, the RSUj then retrieves the public key of
the source of the disputed safety message M by searching
his trace evidence table with item (M,Xi) and returns Xi to
the TA, and then the TA recovers the real identity from the
returned public key.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We analyze the security of the proposed scheme in terms
of the following four aspects: message authentication, user
identity privacy preservation, traceability by the TA, and
threshold authentication.
• Message authentication. Message authentication is the
basic security requirement in vehicular communications.
In the proposed scheme, the signature σ(1) w.r.t public
key Xi can only be generated by the vehicle Vi, who
holds the corresponding private key xi. Without knowing
the discrete logarithms xi of the public keys Xi, it is
infeasible to forge a valid signature σ(1). If a signature
σ(1) w.r.t public key Xi passes the verification procedure,
it must be an intact fresh message generated by Vi. This
implies that the attacker cannot cheat RSU by forging a
new valid message, modifying an existing valid message,
or replaying a once valid but now expired message.
Meanwhile, the signature σ(2) can only be translated
by the RSU from σ(1) by using the corresponding re-
signature key Ri. Furthermore, the RSU cannot generate
the valid signature σ(2) on behalf of Vi using Ri. Thus,
the adversary cannot forge the valid signature σ(2) even
when it only knows the corresponding re-signature key
Ri.
• Threshold authentication. If a vehicle Vi tends to cheat
RSU by endorsing the same message more than once,
then the RSU can easily link the multi signatures by
comparing the public key Xi along with the message.
This kind of message can be either simply discarded or
sent to the TA to trace the cheating vehicle. Hence, the
Sybil attack can be avoided in our privacy-preserving
scheme.
• Identity privacy preservation. The message M and the
signature σ(1) with respect to public key Xi is only
explored to RSUj and Vi since the communication be-
tween Vi and RSUj is confidential. Finding the shared
secret key φ from ψ and XRSUj is an instance of the
CDH problem: given g, ψ = gr, XRSUj = g
xRSUj ,
find φ = gr·xRSUj . Thus, only the RSUj can link the
(Xi, σ
(1)) to the corresponding messageM . Given a valid
signature σ(2) of some message, it is computationally
difficult to identify the actual sending vehicle by any
vehicles in the system since the only information needed
to verify the correctness of signature σ(2) is TA’s public
key XTA.
• Traceability. Given the disputed signature, only the cor-
poration between TA and the RSUj , can trace the real
identity of a message sender using the OBU tracking
procedure described in section IV-D. Besides, the tracing
process carried by the TA does not require any interaction
with the message generator. Instead, the signature itself
provides the authorship information to TA. Therefore,
once a signature is in dispute, the TA has the ability to
trace the disputed message, in which the traceability can
be well satisfied.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed
scheme in terms of storage requirements, and computational
and communication overheads.
A. OBU Storage Overheads
This subsection compares the OBU storage overhead of our
protocol, which we dub PRSB, with three previously proposed
protocols: LAB [3], [4], [9], RSUB [12] and GSB [6], [8],
[17]. In the LAB protocol, each OBU stores not only its own
Nokey anonymous key pairs, but also all the anonymous public
keys and their certificates in the revocation list (the notations
adopted in the description are listed in Table III). Let each
key (with its certificate) occupy one storage unit. If there
are m OBUs revoked, then the scale of revoked anonymous
public keys is m ·Nokey . Thus, the total storage overhead in
LAB protocol (denoted as SLAB) is SLAB = (m+ 1)Nokey .
Assuming that Nokey = 104, we have SLAB = (m+1)104. In
the GSB protocol, each OBU stores one private key issued by
the trusted party, and m revoked public keys in the revocation
list. Let SGSB denotes the total storage unit of GSB protocol.
Thus, SGSB = m+1. Both in the RSUB protocol [12] and our
protocol, each OBU stores one public/private key pair issued
by the trusted party, and its anonymous certificate issued by
the RSU. Since the OBU does not need to store the revocation
list, the storage overhead in RSUB protocol is only two units,
denoted as SRSUB = SPRSB = 2.
Fig.3 shows the storage units of LAB protocol, GSB proto-
col, RSUB protocol and our protocol as m increases. Observe
TABLE III
NOTATIONS AND ROUGH SCALE
Descriptions Scale
Nobu The number of OBUs in the system 107
Nokey The number of anonymous keys owned by one OBU 104
Nrsu The number of RSUs in the system 104
Nrkey The number of anonymous keys processed by one RSU 104
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Fig. 3. OBU storage overhead for the protocols compared as a function of
the number of revoked OBUs
that the OBU storage overhead in LAB protocol linearly
increases with m, and is much larger than that in the other
three protocols. The storage overhead of GSB protocol is still
small in spite of its linear increase with m, while the storage
overhead in the RSUB and our protocol is the most efficient,
which does not increase with m.
B. OBU Communication Overhead
This section compares the communication overheads of the
protocols studied. We assume that all protocols generate a
timestamp to prevent replay attacks so we exclude the length
of the timestamp in this analysis.
For the LAB protocol, each message generates yields 181
bytes as the additional overhead due to cryptographic opera-
tions, which includes a certificate and an Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signature1. For the GSB1 [6],
GSB2 [8] and GSB3 [17] protocol , each message generates
197, 60n + 60 and 133 bytes as the additional overhead
respectively, where n represents the number of the public
key pairs used to generate the ring signature in [8]. For the
RSUB protocols, the additional communication overhead is
70/k + 40 + 147 bytes, where the first term represents the
communication overhead caused by generating the short-term
anonymous key, the second term represents the length of the
1ECDSA signature scheme of IEEE1609.2 [30] is the current standard for
VANETs, where the length of a signature is 42 B.
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signature sent by the vehicle and the last term is the length of
the short time anonymous key and its corresponding certificate
which are reused across k messages (as the RSUB protocol re-
generates the anonymous key only every k messages). For the
proposed protocols, the additional communication overhead is
2 + 20 + 20 + 20 + 20 bytes, where the first term represents
the communication overhead caused by the message ID, the
second term represents the length of the RSUj’s public key,
the third term represents the length of the signature sent by
the vehicle, the fourth term represents the vehicle’s public key
and the last term is the length of the hint (as shown in Table
II).
Fig. 4 shows the relationship between the overall communi-
cation overhead in 1 min and the traffic load within a vehicle.
Obviously, as the number of messages increases, the trans-
mission overhead increases linearly. Clearly, we can observe
that the proposed protocol has much lower communication
overhead than the other protocols.
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD OF THREE PROTOCOLS
Protocol Send a single message Send k messages
LAB 181 bytes 181k bytes
GSB1 197 bytes 197k bytes
GSB2 60n+ 60 bytes (60n+ 60)k bytes
GSB3 133 bytes 133k bytes
RSUB 70/k + 187 bytes 70 + 187k bytes
PRSB 82 bytes 82k bytes
C. OBU Computation Overhead
This subsection compares the OBU computation overhead
for the proposed, RSUB and GSB protocols. Since the point
multiplication in G and pairing computations dominates each
party’s computation overhead, we consider only these opera-
tions in the following estimation. Table V gives the measured
processing time (in milliseconds) for an MNT curve of em-
bedding degree k = 6 and 160-bit q. The implementation was
executed on an Intel pentium IV 3.0 GHz machine.
TABLE V
NOTATIONS AND ESTIMATED EXECUTION TIME FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC
OPERATIONS
Descriptions Execution Time
Tpmul Time for one point multiplication in G 0.6 ms
Tpair Time for one pairing operation 4.5 ms
In our proposed protocol, verifying a message, requires
4Tpair as shown in section IV-C. Let TPRSB be the required
time cost in our protocol, then we have:
TPRSB = 4Tpair = 4× 4.5 = 18(ms)
In the RSUB protocol, to verify a message, it requires
3Tpair + 11Tpmul. Let TRSUB be the required time cost in
RSUB’s protocol, then we have:
TRSUB = 3Tpair+11Tpmul = 3×4.5+11×0.6 = 20.1(ms)
In the GSB protocol [6], the time cost to verify a message
is related to the number of revoked OBUs in the revocation
list. Thus the required time is demonstrated as follows:
TGSB1 = 6Tpmul+(4+m)Tpair = 6×0.6+(4+m)×4.5(ms)
Let
TPG =
TPRSB
TGSB
=
4× 4.5
3.6 + (4 +m)× 4.5
TRG =
TRSUB
TGSB
=
3× 4.5 + 11× 0.6
3.6 + (4 +m)× 4.5
be the cost ratio between the PRSB and the GSB protocol, and
between the RSUB and the GSB protocol, respectively. Fig.5
plots the time cost ratio TPG and TRG when m OBUs are re-
voked, as m ranges from 1 to 100. We observe that both of the
time cost ratios decreases as m increases, which demonstrates
the much better efficiency of our proposed protocol and RSUB
protocol than the GSB protocol especially when the revocation
list is large. We also observe that our proposed protocol is a
little more efficient than RSUB protocol.
VII. SUMMARY
We have presented an efficient conditional privacy pre-
serving protocol with trustworthy based on the proxy re-
signature and aimed for secure vehicular communications.
We demonstrate that proposed protocol is not only provides
conditional privacy, a critical requirement in VANETs, but also
able to improve the confidence of message receiver. By this
way, our protocol achieves both priori and posteriori coun-
termeasures simultaneously. Through extensive performance
evaluation, we have demonstrated that the proposed protocol
can achieve much better efficiency than previously reported
counterparts in terms of the number of keys stored at each
vehicle, communication overhead and, message verification.
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